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Abstract: With an eye on developing a quantum theory of gravity, many physicists
have recently searched for quantum challenges to the equivalence principle of general rela-
tivity. However, as historians and philosophers of science are well aware, the principle of
equivalence is not so clear. When clarified, we think quantum tests of the equivalence prin-
ciple won’t yield much. The problem is that the clash/not-clash is either already evident
or guaranteed not to exist. Nonetheless, this work does help teach us what it means for a
theory to be geometric.
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1 Introduction
Essential to the search for a theory of quantum gravity is a good understanding of exactly
where quantum mechanics and general relativity conflict. Rather than focus on the periph-
eral claims of each theory, its natural to instead concentrate on conflicts that may arise
among core principles. Hence some research has examined tensions arising from applying
the principle of superposition - surely a core aspect of quantum mechanics, if any - to the
gravitational context. However, since the principle of superposition generates notoriously
perplexing conceptual difficulties, such as the quantum measurement problem, this path is
fraught with complications. More promising, perhaps, would be working in the other di-
rection: instead of finding gravitational phenomena that conflict with a core principle of
quantum mechanics, discover quantum phenomena that conflict with a core principle of
relativity. Given the increasingly sensitive accuracy of quantum measurements and the com-
parative difficulty of gravitational measurements, this path may better yield to practical
investigation too.
Motivated in part by the above reasons, there has recently emerged a literature in physics
that seeks quantum challenges to the equivalence principle.1 The equivalence principle is a
natural one to associate with the core of general relativity. On its face, it is more substantive
than the symmetry of general covariance; that is, there are generally covariant spacetimes
that do not obey the principle of equivalence. Furthermore, general covariance finds itself
almost as controversial as superposition in quantum theory. So if looking for a quantum clash
with a core principle of general relativity, the equivalence principle has a lot to recommend
itself.
However, as historians and philosophers of science are well aware, the principle of equiva-
lence is itself hardly the best understood principle we have. Outside the realm of textbooks,
there are almost as many equivalence principles as there are authors writing on the topic.
The question naturally arises: if quantum mechanics conflicts with the equivalence principle,
which one does it conflict with? Right now some papers find conflicts where others do not.
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Here we hope to resolve these ambiguities by showing that different equivalence principles
are at stake. By clarifying various equivalence principles and challenges, we hope to organize
the messy literature on this topic. That said, our main goal is not merely clerical. The point
of this literature is to find meaningful clashes between the quantum and classical. As we
clarify, we evaluate the particular claims about each clash/not clash for each equivalence
principle. Although there is much of interest here with respect to general relativity and the
equivalence principle, an outcome of this analysis is that well end up very skeptical about
this avenue of study. Read one way, quantum mechanics does clash with the equivalence
principle, but this principle isnt in fact part of general relativity. Read as something plausi-
bly part of general relativity, by contrast, the principle simply cannot conflict with quantum
mechanics. Either way, a quantum conflict with the equivalence principle doesnt shed as
much light on quantum gravity as we would hope. Nonetheless, it does, we think, teach us
something about what it means to say that gravity is geometrical.
The literature contains a vast array of logically and physically inequivalent statements
of the equivalence principle. We believe these principles can be neatly classified into four
categories that represent the different core ideas at stake. The four groups correspond
to propositions about the i) universality of free fall, ii) equivalence between homogeneous
gravitational fields and uniform accelerated motion, iii) universality of behavior of physical
systems in small regions of spacetime and iv) universal and minimal character of matter-
gravitational couplings. There are of course various interconnections among the different
classes, but a clear recognition of their differences is essential for an assessment of possible
clashes with the quantum formalism. Lets begin with the universality of free fall.
2 Universality of Free Fall
The universality of free fall, often referred to as the weak equivalence principle, is the claim
associated with Galileo’s famous experiment of dropping bodies of different mass from a
great height. It asserts that
(EP1) All test bodies fall in a gravitational field with the same acceleration
regardless of their mass or internal composition.
EP1 is exactly true in Newtonian mechanics, as it is equivalent to the requirement of equality
between inertial and gravitational masses. This principle even remains true if we drop the
test character demand since the trajectory of the center of mass of any mass distribution in
free fall is independent of its composition and internal structure.
In quantum mechanics, by contrast, the situation is more complicated and perhaps sur-
prising. The first indication of trouble comes from the demand of a test object, for this
requirement poses serious problems in the quantum domain. This is because in a quantum
mechanical context i) we may not be able to make the energy of a particle as small as we
want in order to avoid back-reaction, ii) we cannot make the momentum of a particle as
small as desired and continue to demand localization, and iii) objects may be affected by
measurements and failure to recognize this may result in internal contradictions. In addition,
it is hardly clear what the “free” in “free fall” means in a quantum world. What does it
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mean for an extended object, a probability distribution, to be freely falling?1
Worse, even if these complications could be ignored, the fact remains that quantum
objects do not even satisfy the essence of EP1. That is, the behavior of quantum particles
in external gravitational fields is mass dependent. While this has been clearly recognized
in particular situations, e.g., the COW experiments [Colella et al., 1975], it often has been
considered an atypical behavior. In any case, this mass-dependent behavior is not that
uncommon and should come as no surprise taking into account that the behavior of even
free quantum particles is mass dependent. To see this consider the fact that, contrary to
what happens in Newton’s law for a free particle, ma = 0, the mass does not drop from the
corresponding Schro¨dinger equation
i￿ ∂ψ
∂t
= − ￿
2
2m
∇2ψ . (1)
For the specific case of quantum particles in uniform gravitational fields, by invoking Ehren-
fest’s theorem it is clear that the mean time taken by the particle to fall is equal to what
would be expected classically. Nevertheless, an estimate of fluctuations around this mean
value can also be calculated [Viola and Onofrio, 2004, Ali et al., 2006], yielding a standard
deviation proportional to ￿/m, thus signaling the non-universality of quantum free fall.
Therefore, the time of descent of very light particles is expected to deviate greatly from the
Newtonian value but the behavior of heavy objects is, reassuringly, expected to approach
the classical, mass-independent result.
What are we to make of the fact that quantum mechanics does not satisfy the universal-
ity of free fall? Of course, if the equivalence principle is understood as EP1 then quantum
mechanics violates it. But is this interesting or relevant to the search for quantum gravity?
One point of view would be to say that it is because it undermines the motivation for think-
ing of gravity as geometric (see for example [Anandan, 1980, Sonego, 1995, Ahluwalia, 1997,
Aldrovandi et al., 2006]). The fact that all classical bodies move in the same way in a gravi-
tational field, says the conventional wisdom, is what allows for a geometric description of the
gravitational field. Nevertheless, although this type of reasoning is natural, we do not think
it is correct. First, at most it would remove one reason for thinking it geometric, not provide
a reason for thinking it not. Second, it does not even accomplish that, for notice that EP1
does not even hold exactly in general relativity, the archetypal geometrical theory. The point
is that the geodesic principle, i.e., the fact that free objects follow spacetime geodesics, is not
valid in general, but can only be exactly proven for special systems like very light (i.e., non-
back-reacting) point-particles [Geroch and Jang, 1975], and not even in that case if certain
energy conditions are not satisfied [Malament, 2009]. And since classical point-particles can
have no internal structure whatsoever (except mass), in general relativity EP1 is not satis-
fied independently of internal structure but only for particles with no such thing as internal
structure. Quantum mechanical point-particles on the other hand can of course possess spin,
1This problem even survives transition into quantum ontologies that do have determinate objects, such as
Bohmian mechanics. [Sonego, 1995] puts Bohm’s particle interpretation theory into second-order formulation
to see what “free” Bohm particles look like, but [Valentini, 1995] rightly points out that the theory is really
a first-order one. “Free” Bohm particles, in this formulation, just sit still. Rather than draw the conclusion
Valentini does, namely, that Bohmian mechanics demands a spacetime with Aristotelian structure, we take
this as a reductio of the approach that demands that the Newtonian framework of free versus forced motion
is strictly applicable in a quantum world.
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and as is well known spinning point-objects do not follow geodesics [Papapetrou, 1951]. As
for extended objects, it is not clear what it means for them to satisfy the geodesic principle.
One way to interpret it would be to check if the center of mass of the distribution follows
a geodesic but note that the definition of center of mass in general relativity is notoriously
difficult and controversial [Dixon, 1964, Beiglbck, 1967, Madore, 1969, Adamo et al., 2009].
It is interesting to note that both in quantum mechanics and general relativity the uni-
versality of free fall is not true in general but is recovered in certain limits. However, the
limits in which it is recovered in each case are in a sense opposite since in general relativity
we need to consider light particles to avoid back-reaction, but in quantum mechanics those
are precisely the particles that deviate the most from an exact massless behavior.
Finally, another reason to mistrust the link between universality of free fall and geo-
metricity of spacetime is given by the fact that in some cases the universality of free fall is
not sufficient for geometrization. The universality of free fall guaranties that the path of
free particles is independent of internal structure; however, it’s also important that other
forms of dependence, for example velocity, be avoided too. To illustrate this point, consider
a region of spacetime with a given background electromagnetic field, and suppose that in
order to probe it we only have at our disposal test particles of fixed q/m ratio. It follows
from the Lorentz force law that the trajectories of all such particles will satisfy a toy version
of the universality of free fall: trajectories will be equal for any two particles sharing initial
position and velocity, independently of structure and composition (of course, except for the
part that fixes the q/m ratio). The question is then if it is possible to describe the trajec-
tories of the available test particles as geodesics of a certain curved spacetime, as is done
with gravity? Is it the case that the restricted universality of free fall implies that in this
scenario the electromagnetic field can be geometrized? The answer is no. This is because,
according to the Lorentz force law, the acceleration suffered by a particle depends on its
velocity. Therefore, as opposed to the gravitational case, no family of inertial frames can be
associated with each spacetime point. That is, there is no state of motion with respect to
which all of our test particles at a given point are not accelerating, which is exactly what
happens with gravity. Universality of free fall does not imply the ability to geometrize a
force.2
Yet another motive for not counting the lack of universality of quantum free fall as an
argument against the geometric picture of gravity is to note that the mass-dependence of
freely falling quantum particles can be understood on the basis of kinematical arguments.
This takes us to the second class of equivalence principles above, those referring to a full
equivalence between homogeneous gravitational fields and uniform accelerated motion.
2Notice that the above argument could seem to contradict the existence of gravitomagnetic forces, i.e.,
the fact that in linearized general relativity and when the lowest order effects of the motion of the sources are
considered, the geodesic equation for test bodies closely resembles the Lorentz force law (see [Wald, 1984]).
How could the Lorentz force law prevent geometrization if it is present in general relativity itself? Note
however that whereas in the electromagnetic case the appearance of the Lorentz force law is taken to be
fundamental its appearance in general relativity is only an artifact of the approximation, in particular of
setting v0 = dx0/dτ ≈ 1.
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3 Einstein’s Equivalence Principle
In Newtonian mechanics, the mass-independence described by EP1 implies that in the pres-
ence of a uniform gravitational field Newton’s equations can be dramatically simplified. In
fact, it allows us to introduce coordinates that remove the effects of gravity completely.3
Wanting something similar (see [Norton, 1985]), Einstein formulated:
(EP2) A state of rest in a homogeneous gravitational field is physically indistin-
guishable from a state of uniform acceleration in a gravity-free space.
Note that, unlike EP1, this statement constrains the totality of physical systems, not only
the mechanical behavior of very special systems, i.e., free test particles. As such, it is a
more general principle and potentially of greater relevance to an assessment of the geometric
character of gravity at the quantum level.
From the point of view of EP2, the universality of free fall, i.e., the fact that the behavior
of classical particles in a gravitational field is mass-independent, must be considered a logical
consequence of the important but seemingly innocuous fact that the behavior of free classical
particles is mass-independent – note that there is no need to introduce mass in order to
enunciate Newton’s first law. The reasoning goes like this. The behavior of free particles is
mass-independent and remains so when observed from an accelerated reference frame. Now,
if Einstein’s principle obtains, the same mass-independent behavior must be expected in a
homogeneous gravitational field. On the other hand, if the behavior of free quantum particles
is mass-dependent then it is only natural – again, if Einstein’s principle holds – to expect
a quantum departure from universal free fall. From this perspective the universality of free
fall ceases to be a fundamental aspect of the equivalence principle. It is instead recognized
as a mere instance of EP2 applied to a specific law – namely, the mass-independent behavior
of classical particles. EP2 stipulates an equivalence of behavior for all physical laws and, in
particular, it constrains the behavior of freely falling classical particles. Entities satisfying
different laws, quantum particles for example, may not at the same time satisfy universality
of free fall and Einstein’s equivalence principle.
In this light it seems misleading to call EP1 the weak equivalence principle. That name
suggests that it must be logically contained in other versions. Nevertheless, as we have
shown, EP2 is independent of the so-called weak equivalence principle. That is, it could be
valid even if there are no systems in the world satisfying universality of free fall.
Is EP2 satisfied n quantum mechanics? In the last section we saw that quantum free
fall is mass-dependent. For EP2 to hold the mass dependence must be such that it is the
same as that observed by an accelerated observer for a free quantum particle. Interestingly,
this is precisely the case! This assertion can be demonstrated in general by the fact that
Schro¨dinger’s equation for a particle in a homogeneous gravitational field of strength a,
i￿ ∂ψ
∂t
= − ￿
2
2m
∇2ψ +maz ψ , (2)
3Newton’s second law and law of gravitation tell us that mj x¨j =
￿
iFij +Mjg , where m is the inertial
mass, M the gravitational mass, g a constant gravitational acceleration, and Fij the net force of particle
i on j. Due to the weak equivalence principle, m = M , and letting x￿j = xj − 12gt2 , one eliminates the
gravitational field: mj x¨j =
￿
iFij .
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gets transformed, via the coordinate transformation to an accelerated frame
z = z￿ + vt￿ +
1
2
at￿2 (3)
t = t￿ , (4)
to a free particle equation
i￿ ∂ψ
￿
∂t￿
= − ￿
2
2m
∇￿2ψ￿ , (5)
with4 ψ￿ = eiα(z,t)ψ (see [Greenberger and Overhauser, 1979]). Of course the non-trivial
result is that the gravitational interaction can be treated in the non-relativistic quantum
context as just another external potential, i.e., by the introduction in Schro¨dinger’s equation
of the term5 maz ψ. This important fact has been confirmed experimentally in, e.g., COW-
type settings [Bonse and Worblewski, 1983]. Then, in so far as the equivalence principle is
understood in Einstein’s terms, quantum mechanics does not violate it. Whereas the COW
experiments were considered evidence against the equivalence principle, understood as EP1,
they turn out to be favorable confirmation of the equivalence principle, understood as EP2.
As we pointed out above, the conformity of quantum mechanics with EP2 is to be decided
solely by experiment. EP2 constrains experimental results and not our laws of physics (cf.
EP4 below). The point that we are trying to stress here is that i) all experiments performed
so far corroborate it and ii) no clash between quantum mechanics and E2 can be found
theoretically.
We think of the ability to fully predict a system’s behavior in a homogeneous gravitational
field by simply considering its behavior when uniformly accelerated as the real empirical
pattern behind the equivalence principle. Stepping back, this result is a bit curious. Naively,
one might have thought that the ability to get the same results in these two situations
was due ultimately to the universality of free fall. But that is not right, since, as we have
seen, EP1 does not hold in quantum mechanics – quantum free fall is mass-dependent. Yet
surprisingly this mass-dependence does not preclude the obtaining of this empirical pattern
and hence EP2. In retrospect, given that the universality of free fall does not hold exactly in
general relativity either, and yet general relativity motivates the equivalence principle, it’s
clear that the universality of free fall had better not have been the source of this empirical
pattern.
In any case, EP2 is very limited. The restriction to homogeneous gravitational fields
means that it is not a core principle of general relativity. For this reason EP2 is not going
4The phase factor in this transformation is mass-dependent and this fact might be viewed with suspicion.
The mass-dependence is clearly a good thing for EP2, as John Earman reminds us, since it leads to a
superselection rule for mass in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. That is, a coherent superposition of
states of different mass is prohibited and this prohibition protects EP2 from possible violations due to
interference effects between particles of different mass. On these points see [Greenberger, 1979]. Still, one
might wonder what warrants the particular form of this transformation? One cannot justify it as one does
the corresponding phase factor when transforming from one inertial reference frame to another, i.e., by
demanding Galilean invariance. We acknowledge this deficiency and can point only to the fact that the
particular transformation works (is compatible with the experimental evidence).
5For similar points of view see [Borner and Schlieder, 1980, Staudenmann et al., 1980,
Chryssomalakos and Sudarsky, 2003, Unnikrishnan, 2002, Herdegen and Wawrzycki, 2002,
S. Huerfano and Socolovsky, 2006].
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to be of deep relevance to quantum gravity, inasmuch as that theory is concerned with
reconciling our best theory of homogeneous and inhomogeneous gravitational fields with
quantum matter. Conflict with the empirical pattern of course would be interesting but this
conflict isn’t predicted by quantum mechanics.
Can EP2 be extended to more general situations? Here physicists, historians and philoso-
phers have been frustrated. A plethora of principles have been proposed, with little agree-
ment resulting. In what follows we’ll examine some of the paths that have been explored.
4 Small Enough Regions
General relativity assumes that spacetime can be represented as a pseudo-Riemannian man-
ifold with Lorentzian signature. On such a manifold, the tangent space to any point is
Minkowski spacetime, the flat spacetime of gravity-less special relativity. This fact, coupled
with the motivation of extending EP2 to generic spacetimes, suggests the natural strategy
of trying to “homogenize” inhomogeneous fields by going local. As one looks at smaller
patches of spacetime, inhomogeneous fields appear more homogeneous. In the infinitesimal
neighborhood of a point, an inhomogeneous field is homogeneous. Perhaps by restricting the
principle to such regions, the thought is, one can obtain a universally valid statement that
is true for variably-curved spacetimes.
It’s intuitive to think that as an extended body shrinks the effects of curvature de-
crease. [Ohanian, 1977], however, brings out a consideration that initially points against any
“going local” strategy. He notes that one can in principle “feel” the non-vanishing of the
Riemann tensor even at a point. Consider a drop of liquid without surface tension in free
fall. When in the presence of gravity, the drop’s shape will not be spherical but instead
display the familiar “bulge” of tidal distortion. Ohanian shows that this distortion doesn’t
go to zero as the droplet’s radius approaches zero.
Some commentators complain that Ohanian’s example, when properly conceived as a
process that takes time, is actually not very local. But this immediately raises the question
of what is. Responding to this worry suggests a strategy of making the equivalence principle
relative to certain measurement scales.
The idea behind this approach is that the physical behavior of a freely falling system can
be made, to a given accuracy, universal, by making its size sufficiently small. Hence:
(EP3) For every experimental apparatus with some limiting accuracy, and for
every spacetime event, there exists a (spacetime) neighborhood of that event
such that the outcome of any measurement within that region with the experi-
mental apparatus in free fall, is independent of the event and the velocity of the
apparatus.6
Arguably, EP3 is both interesting and true. In a small enough region of spacetime and with
some limiting accuracy, we won’t be able to detect the tidal distortions of Ohanian’s drop.
Or put differently, if we did detect tidal distortions, then the system under consideration,
the drop, is too large to fit the authorized region, in which case EP3 doesn’t have to hold.
6It is common with equivalence principles of this type to distinguish between cases including or excluding
gravitational experiments. All we say about EP3 here holds either way.
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Our epistemic capacities help “homogenize” the inhomogeneous fields, allowing us to extend
EP2. Note however that this epistemic element does not leave EP3 empty since it entails
the highly non-trivial claim that, given a limiting accuracy and a local spacetime curvature
scale, we can always find a region where it holds, i.e., where the physical behavior of a freely
falling system can be made universal.
Despite its non-triviality, we don’t think EP3 is capable of providing a meaningful test of
the conflict between general relativity and the quantum world. This is because the accuracy
and size limitations that insulate EP3 from Ohanian’s drop also insulate EP3 from any quan-
tum challenge. The point is that for any quantum experiment that confronts the equivalence
principle there are two options: either the quantum system fits inside the region authorized
by EP3, in which case we are back to a situation analogous to the one encountered by EP2
(a clash could be found experimentally but it will not arise theoretically) or the system
does not fit the region, in which case EP3 simply becomes mute. This isn’t to say that this
last case couldn’t be useful. Experiments that attempt to detect gravitational tidal effects
using quantum mechanical probes have been proposed lately [Chiao, 2003, Sudarsky, 2005],
holding the promise to bring clues about the character of gravity at the quantum level.
What goes for Ohanian’s drops goes for quantum systems. The “small enough” reading
of the equivalence principle, with the stress on “enough,” guarantees compatibility between
quantum systems and the equivalence principle. Read as EP3, quantum mechanics can’t
pose a challenge to the equivalence principle.
5 Couplings
Another reaction to the considerations brought out at the beginning of the last section is
to formalize the notion of “special relativity holding” at a single spacetime point. If one
literally means special relativity holds then this isn’t defensible (since that would include
the vanishing of the Riemann tensor), but perhaps a different sense can be specified in which
it is. Consider, for instance,
(EP4) All nongravitational fields couple to a single gravitational field (univer-
sality), and at each point of spacetime it is possible to find a coordinate trans-
formation such that the gravitational field variables can be eliminated from the
field equations of matter (minimal coupling).
Like EP3, we believe that a good argument can be made for EP4’s truth and interest. EP4
is also a substantive principle. There are two claims here, universality and minimal coupling.
Universality insists that all matter fields couple to a single gravitational field. This demand
rules out bimetric theories of gravity, for instance. Minimal coupling is the addition that
specifies what “special relativity holding” means. On our formulation, this rules out logically
possible laws such as
∇a∇aφ−m2φ− ξRφ = 0 (6)
where φ is a scalar field, R the Ricci scalar and ξ a coupling constant. One could insist
that the equations actually look like a proper subset of those holding in special relativity,
as in [Ghins and Budden, 2001], but we have chosen the less restrictive form that merely
demands the possible elimination of the gravitational field variables from the field equations
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of matter. The intuition behind EP4 is that all non-gravitational fields “feel” the same
gravitational field, but they do so weakly, so that at each point of spacetime it is possible
to find a coordinate transformation such that neither the Riemann curvature tensor nor its
contractions appear in the laws.
We pause to note that universality and minimal coupling are logically independent. One
can imagine (and sometimes finds) equivalence principles referring solely to one or the other
component.7 In addition, although we prefer EP4’s formulation, there are many distinct
ways of understanding minimal coupling. Finally, either of these principles can be combined
with the measurement accuracy clause of EP3. A combinatorial explosion of possible prin-
ciples threatens. Nonetheless, we believe that what we say about EP1-EP4 applies, mutatis
mutandis, to the other combinations envisioned.
Although EP4 describes some deep features of our theories, it is a bit disappointing as
regards any possible quantum challenge. The problem is that EP4 builds in compatibility
with the quantum.8 Note that it refers only to the form of the laws of physics but remains
silent about experimental results. The principle demands that all quantum fields feel the
same gravitational field but have dynamical equations of motion that make no essential
reference to Rabcd. Well, that’s true, and it’s no accident. The pseudo-Riemannian metric
gab is felt by all the quantum fields; indeed, there exist deep connections between the form of
the dynamical equations and this single metric, e.g., between the Lorentzian signature of the
metric and the hyperbolic form of the partial differential equations describing the evolution.
And of course none of the quantum fields evolve as a function of Rabcd.9 The project of
searching for a quantum challenge to the equivalence principle is over and done with as soon
as EP4 is written!
6 Conclusion
We have shown that, despite all the natural motivation, a search for quantum challenges to
the equivalence principle seems unlikely to yield much. Read as EP1, we already know of the
clash, but we also know that EP1 may not be a part of general relativity, strictly conceived,
nor is it really a part of traditional “Einsteinian” equivalence principles. Read as Einstein’s
EP2, the principle is too limited to be a core principle of relativity. As for the sharpened
versions EP3 or EP4, we either know that quantum mechanics doesn’t predict a clash or
that no clash is guaranteed.
Still, perhaps we’ve learned something from this exercise. It’s natural to think of the
universality of free fall as expressing the sense in which gravity is geometrical. But in
general relativity properly conceived, it seems conventional what to call gravity and not
gravity anyway (see [Norton, 1985]). If there is something to the idea – and this is yet
another posited equivalence principle – all we mean is that all the dynamical matter fields
7 [Anderson, 1967] version is essentially universality; [Ohanian, 1977] is essentially minimal coupling.
8This also happens in Ghins and Budden’s principle DEEP, which requires that all the “fundamental dy-
namical equations” hold. Since the dynamical equations of motion in quantum mechanics are such equations,
it’s automatic that they are compatible.
9Investigations of quantum non-minimal couplings could certainly be very fruitful, but they lie outside
of standard quantum mechanics and thus the scope of the present paper.
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“feel” the same metric. Quantum mechanics won’t challenge this, but maybe quantum
gravity will.
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